Adam C Seitz

Chapter in edited volume Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the MENA Region (Rowman & Littlefield 2016) edited by Elke Grawert and Zeinab Abul-Magd.

The Arab Uprisings have brought renewed attention to the role of the military in the MENA region, where they are either the backbone of regime power or a crucial part of patronage networks in political systems. This collection of essays from international experts examines the economic interests of armed actors ranging from military businesses in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen to retired military officers’ economic endeavors and the web of funding of non-state armed groups in Syria and Libya. Due to the combined power of business and arms, the military often manages to incorporate or quell competing groups and thus, to revert achievements of revolutionary movements.

Chapter in edited volume Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (Saqi Books, 2014) edited by Helen Lackner.

In November 2011, an agreement brokered by the GCC brought an end to Yemen’s tumultuous uprising. The National Dialogue Conference has opened a window of opportunity for change, bringing Yemen’s main political forces together with groups that were politically marginalized. Yet, the risk of collapse is serious, and if Yemen is to remain a viable state, it must address numerous political, social and economic challenges.

In this invaluable volume, experts with extensive Yemen experience provide innovative analysis of the country’s major crises: centralized governance, the role of the military, ethnic conflict, separatism, Islamism, foreign intervention, water scarcity and economic development.

This is essential reading for academics, journalists, development workers, diplomats, politicians and students alike.

"Yemen" chapter in the American Foreign Policy Councils World Almanac of Islamism 2014 (Rowman & Littlefield)

The American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism is a comprehensive resource designed to track the rise or decline of radical Islam on a national, regional and global level. This database focuses on the nature of the contemporary Islamist threat around the world, and on the current activities of radical Islamist movements worldwide.

From Western Europe to Asia, from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, societies are finding themselves under growing assault from radical Islamist forces. In some countries, such as Spain and France, the challenge posed by radical Islam is still limited in scope and embryonic in nature. But in others, including Somalia and Pakistan, it poses a mortal danger to the future of the existing state. The World Almanac of Islamism is the first comprehensive reference work to detail the global reach of Islamism across six continents. Each country study, written by leading subject-matter experts, examines the full scope of the Islamist phenomenon, from the activities of radical Islamist groups to the role of Islamist actors and ideas in society to the response—or complicity—of the local government. An additional series of “movement” studies explores the global reach, ideology, and capabilities of the world’s most powerful transnational Islamist movements. Finally, Almanac includes regional summaries and a global overview designed to provide context and strategic insights into current and emerging trends relating to Islamism the world over.

Features of the new edition include:

- Three new country studies (Nigeria, Brazil, Tanzania)
- Two new movement studies (the Gulen movement and Boko Haram)
- Updates to all original chapters
- Consolidation of trends/analyses into one “Global Overview”

The Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) prepared a detailed analysis of the history and character of U.S. and Iranian strategic competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation.

Co-author of the "Introduction" and "Types and Levels of Competition" chapters of the e-book published in March 2012.

"Yemen" chapter in the American Foreign Policy Councils "World Almanac of Islamism 2011" (Rowman & Littlefield)

The American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism is a comprehensive resource designed to track the rise or decline of radical Islam on a national, regional and global level. This database focuses on the nature of the contemporary Islamist threat around the world, and on the current activities of radical Islamist movements worldwide.

From Western Europe to Asia, from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, societies are finding themselves under growing assault from radical Islamist forces. In some countries, such as Spain and France, the challenge posed by radical Islam is still limited in scope and embryonic in nature. But in others, including Somalia and Pakistan, it poses a mortal danger to the future of the existing state. The World Almanac of Islamism is the first comprehensive reference work to detail the global reach of Islamism across six continents. Each country study, written by leading subject-matter experts, examines the full scope of the Islamist phenomenon, from the activities of radical Islamist groups to the role of Islamist actors and ideas in society to the response – or complicity – of the local government. An additional series of “movement” studies explores the global reach, ideology, and capabilities of the world’s most powerful transnational Islamist movements. Finally, Almanac includes regional summaries and a global overview designed to provide context and strategic insights into current and emerging trends relating to Islamism the world over.

This collection makes a major contribution toward properly defining the Islamist threat and paving the way for the implementation of more effective strategies to counter the rise of radical Islamism by the United States and its allies. It provides policymakers, the news media, scholars, and students with a more comprehensive understanding of the threat we now confront from Islamic extremism. Additionally, the full Almanac is available electronically in database form.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race (Praeger Security International, 2009)

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? is an expert, insider’s look at Iran’s current and potential ability to wage both conventional and asymmetrical warfare—and the options available for dealing with a nuclear Iran.

Are we on the brink of a regional nuclear arms race in the Middle East? In this important volume, Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz examine how Iran's nuclear ambitions have already altered security policy for the United States, Iran's neighbors, and the international community. Cordesman and Seitz address the full range of issues related to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, including its emphasis on medium- and long-range missiles, the decline of Iran's conventional military capabilities, and the continued Iranian efforts to undercut the spread of democracy in the region.

The volume includes hypothetical studies outlining the possible effects of specific nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks by Iran. In addition, it is illustrated with tables and graphs that provide a quantitative and qualitative look at Iran's conventional and asymmetric warfighting capabilities and at the progress of Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

The conflict in Yemen is in its fourth year, and by many assessments warring factions appear to be locked in a stalemate. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and their coalition partners are engaged in a campaign on the Red Sea coast to break the stalemate, shift the balance of forces in their favor, and secure maritime traffic. Secessionist factions, government-allied forces, and various local militias are competing to consolidate gains in the south and east of the county. The US and its allies have continued to pursue a counterterrorism campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Yemen. The complexity of Yemen’s multifaceted conflict is emblematic of the international security environment and the types of intersecting conflicts that policymakers and military planners face when advancing US national security interests and meeting the challenges posed by revisionist actors in the gray zone. ............(Read on)..............

"The Tribal-Military-Commercial Complex and the Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Yemen" in Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen (2017)

Chapter in a report entitled Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention During and Post-Conflict. The report was edited by Marie-Christine Heinze and published by the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) on 20 December 2017.

This report is the result of a conference with the same name, which was jointly organized by CARPO and the Regional Office Gulf States of the KAS at the Dead Sea in April 2017. The papers by prolific experts on Yemen included in this publication discuss the changes, obstacles and limits for successful security sector reform in Yemen during and after the conflict and offer respective recommendations for national and international policy-makers in the field.

As Yemen's internal war continues to drag on with no end in sight, there is increased risk of miscalculations that may lead to further escalation and internationalization of the conflict. Increased regional and international geopolitical competition, continued efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism and Islamic extremism emanating from the region, and maritime security concerns that threaten the global economy and freedom of navigation have only increased Yemen's strategic importance to the national security agendas of regional and international actors alike. 1 Such considerations have not been lost on Yemen's domestic incumbent and insurgent elites, contributing, in part, to political and military strategies that seek to manage but not entirely eliminate internal security threats that pose challenges to the national security interests of regional and international actors. As such, Houthi expansionism and the ongoing internal war may be better understood in the context of the development of a domestic elite strategic culture that has contributed to perpetual insecurity and internal war in Yemen. Strategic culture can be described as traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals. When viewed through the lens of strategic culture, Houthi expansionism, and internal war in Yemen generally, should not be viewed as an aberration that seeks to change the status quo. Rather, it should be considered a continuation of established political norms and military-decision making institutionalized under the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which seeks to balance a host of internal and external actors and potential threats within an environment dominated by elite competition and internal factionalization, in the absence of effective state institutions and a clear monopoly on the use of violence by the state. Such a governing strategy has contributed to the proliferation of militias and other irregular and non-state forces, military factionalization, and increasingly the formation of civil-military relations akin to warlordism, in which military and/or tribal elites exercise civil power at a local or regional level through their influence and control of militias. 2 Within this domestic environment, the military has played a central role in linking a number of disparate groups to the regime, while at the same time factionalization has allowed for effective divide and rule tactics to shield the regime from reprisal. Furthermore, the dependence of the Yemeni economy on a combination of oil revenues, remittances, and, increasingly, foreign aid has left the Yemeni government vulnerable to external market forces and shocks associated with geopolitical competition. Within this geopolitical setting, internal war and perpetual insecurity threatening regional and international interests have supported a growing war economy and helped to prop up the armed forces as a central player in patronage politics and the economy writ large through its role in the tribal-military-commercial complex and the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO)—formerly the Military Economic Corporation or MECO—, which has its hands in nearly all facets of the Yemeni economy and serves as a conduit for foreign aid. 3 ............(Read on)..............

The January 22, 2015 resignation of the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi and the ensuing chaos have once again sparked both fears of the collapse of the Republic of Yemen as we know it and concerns about the effectiveness of international counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. The same combination of elite competition, military factionalization, and ever-shifting alliances that contributed to Yemen’s current political crisis and insecurity continue to provide al-Qaeda with a foothold in Yemen. Any counterterrorism strategy by the U.S. and its international partners must take such factors into consideration, or risk further internationalizing the Yemeni crisis and plunging deeper into Yemen’s counterterrorism abyss.............(Read on)..............

In July 2014, the northern Yemeni city of Amran fell to insurgents led by Abdul-Maik al-Houthi. Amran had served as the capital for the elders of the influential Hashid tribal confederation since the 1962 Republican Revolution. Less than two months after the capture of Amran, Houthi militias swept into Sanaa, seizing a number of government buildings and military installations, setting up checkpoints throughout the Yemeni capital, and ultimately forcing the Yemeni government led by President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi to sign the “Peace and Partnership” agreement on September 21, 2014. This in effect created a new political order in Yemen. In the two months following the agreement, the Houthis have captured a number of strategically important cities, including the port city of Hudaydah, and have advanced on a number of others controlled by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its local affiliate Ansar alSharia (AAS).

Since 2002, U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately destroy al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Yemen have relied upon a combination of partnership with the Yemeni military that includes capacity building of Yemeni security forces and U.S. airstrikes. Although the Houthis and the U.S. share a common enemy in AQAP and AAS, this does not equate to a situation in which the enemy of my enemy is my friend. On the contrary, the military and political gains made by the Houthis have created a new set of challenges for counterterrorism efforts in Yemen by the United States and its allies.......(Read on).............

On 10 September 2014, U.S. President Barak Obama addressed the nation to lay out his administration’s strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant].” To this end President Obama proposed a counterterrorism strategy that relied on a “systematic campaign of airstrikes” and an “increase in support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground.” Comparing his strategy for ISIL to counterterrorism campaigns in Yemen and Somalia President Obama stated that, “This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years.”

President Obama’s use of Yemen and Somalia as models for a strategy against ISIL has once again reignited the debate on the overall effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in both cases. In the case of the “Yemen Model,” a strategy, which has relied upon a combination of airstrikes and support for local forces, has thus far fallen short of the ultimate objective of destroying al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its local affiliate Ansar al-Sharia (AAS). Indeed, most intelligence and think-tank estimates point to an increase in the number of attacks and the size of AQAP in recent years. This is not to say that U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been completely ineffective, but rather that U.S. efforts have been limited by realities on the ground, especially those contributing to a lack of reliable and effective local partners. Understanding how the political and security environment in Yemen have limited U.S. counterterrorism efforts against AQAP may be useful in managing expectations as the U.S. seeks to duplicate the successes of the “Yemen Model” in Iraq and Syria.............(Read on)..........

Over the past decade smuggling across the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb has risen steadily. The illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people continues to fuel sectarian and political violence, threatening Yemen's fragile political transition. At the same time, with a coastline stretching almost 2,000 km along some of the world most strategic waterways, Yemen's continued internal instability and insecurity perpetuates international concerns that Yemen may become a regional hub for transnational smuggling, piracy, and terrorism, posing a significant threat to the free flow of international trade and international security. As such, building the capacity of Yemen's maritime security forces should be a top priority, not only for the Yemeni government but for the international community as a whole.....Read on.....

The use of unmanned drones for the targeted killing of suspected terrorists remains a hotly debated topic among academics, human rights groups, and policymakers alike. Drone strikes following the December 4th 2013 attack on the Yemeni Defense Ministry have reinvigorated the debate, especially as the Yemeni government’s security committee and local officials appear divided on the details of the December 12th drone strike. Much of the debate continues to revolve around the legality of extrajudicial targeted killings and the associated collateral damage, including civilian causalities, rising anti-Americanism and the undercutting of Yemen’s political transition. Such arguments, however, miss the mark when it comes to the overall effectiveness of drones when compared to the alternatives, and fail to put forth a convincing answer to the question: “If not drones, then what?” The reality in a case like Yemen, at least in the near-to-medium term, is that no viable alternative options exist for combating Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its affiliates, especially given the post-2011 political and security environment.........(Read on)............

One year ago, on November 23, 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, ending his 33-year presidency and transferring power to then-Vice President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi as the first step in Yemen’s transition. Nearly one year after Saleh signed the GCC Initiative, the preparatory committee for national dialogue announced that Yemen’s Conference for National Dialogue had been pushed back to early 2013. The Dialogue is an essential element of the Initiative aimed at unifying a deeply divided country and laying the foundation for the drafting of a new constitution. The November announcement marked the latest delay since the April 2012 date for National Dialogue was first announced, highlighting the challenges Yemen still faces moving forward with implementing the GCC Initiative. One barrier that continues to stand in the way of National Dialogue, and further implementation of the Initiative as a whole, is the restructuring of the armed forces. Although the restructuring of the Yemeni armed forces is stipulated as a part of the first phase of the GCC Initiative, ambiguity within the document has left room for Saleh’s relatives to maintain their posts in the military in post-Saleh Yemen............(Read on)..........

IRAN'S CONTINUING CHALLENGE IN A TIME OF ARAB TURMOIL, By Adam C. Seitz and Anthony H. Cordesman, The Montréal Review, May 2011.

by Adam C. Seitz and Anthony H. Cordesman

The Islamic Republic of Iran presents a wide range of challenges in a region that is already plagued by insecurity and conflict. As long-standing regimes are threatened by the wave of anti-government protests rolling across the Middle East, Tehran continues to advance its policies intended to expand its influence throughout the region in spite of its own internal challenges and power struggles within its leadership. At a time when the Arab spring is producing unpredictable changes in regional regimes and alignments, Tehran's aggressive regional policy, growing asymmetric warfare capabilities, and developing nuclear and ballistic missile programs present a separate set of challenges of great strategic importance..........(Read on).............

Following the successful ousting of Presidents Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, anti-government protests continue to challenge the rule of long-standing regimes throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The 32-year rule of Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah Saleh is no exception. Widespread corruption, growing economic and resource inequality, and internal fragmentation have pushed anti-government protesters into the streets demanding the immediate ouster of President Saleh, challenging the stability of a country already on the brink of becoming a failed state.

Even before Yemen was swept up by the wave of protests rolling through the region, the Saleh regime had been faced with a number of daunting challenges: a slew of economic and social issues, the Islamist al-Houthi rebellion in the north, a resilient secessionist movement in the south, and a resurgent al-Qaeda offshoot seeking to take advantage of Yemen’s domestic conflicts and demographics.

In the past, Saleh has been relatively effective in managing the issues his regime has faced through power-sharing arrangements brokered with various tribal leaders, Islamist groups and political factions. Recently, however, shifting alliances have put this system to the test.........(Read on).........

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Doctrine, Policy and Command

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

January 12, 2009

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

Iran presents many challenges in analyzing its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. One is that a nation that denies it is acquiring such weapons does not have a public strategy or doctrine for using them, much less clear plans to acquire them. The second is that Iran has an extremely complex national command authority, where many key elements virtually bypass its president – as well as other national decision-making apparatuses – and report to its Supreme Leader. It also seems to place its missile systems, and much of its military industry under its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and it is this force that seems to be responsible for the development and control of any programs to develop, manufacture, and deploy weapons of mass destruction. Making this situation all the more complex and volatile is the growing influence of the IRGC – especial hard-line members – in the Iranian political arena.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Part V: The Broader Strategic Context

by Anathony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

December 8, 2008

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The most current draft is now available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_IranNucStratCon.pdf
This draft is key to understanding the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD programs.
Iran has found that an overall asymmetric strategy would be most beneficial to maintaining balance of power and expanding its power and influence in the Middle East region. This strategy has also enabled the Iranian government and military to operate more covertly, both in terms of building capabilities for covert, proxy, and indirect warfare, and in developing a possible nuclear weapons program.

Tehran focused its defense efforts on creating a force structure to pursue an asymmetric strategy which focuses more on the use of proxies to create greater regional instability and export its revolution, while at the same time it has pushed the limits in its missile programs, and pursued the research and development of chemical and biological agents as well as a suspect nuclear program; which together have the makings of a very dangerous and WMD program. 

This is why any assessment of Iran’s motives and capabilities must look beyond the previous assessments of the military balance. Whatever Iran’s actual motives may be a combination of its emerging strengths in asymmetric warfare and nuclear-armed missile forces that can deter or limit conventional reprisals can do much to compensate for its lack of modern conventional forces. 

Iran can exploit a combination of carefully selected precision guided munitions systems, weapons of mass destruction, and the widening use of asymmetrical warfare strategies to make up for shortcomings in conventional warfighting capabilities. Its long-range missiles and WMD programs can both provide a powerful deterrent and support its asymmetric strategies.

This draft covers the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD real and potential capability. It covers how all of the aspects of Iran’s WMD programs fit into the broader strategic context with Iran’s conventional military forces, the IRGC, use and support of proxies, and ambiguous statements and actions.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Work in Progress?

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

November 6, 2008

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The fourth working draft in this series is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081106_iranwmdnuclear.pdf
This draft covers multiple aspects of Iran’s nuclear programs, including an assessment of Iran’s current nuclear status and possible future nuclear capabilities. In this draft is a history of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the progress in the different sectors of Iran’s nuclear programs, the declared and possible functions of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and issues posed by Iranian ambiguity regarding its nuclear program, among other aspects of Iran’s nuclear program.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Part III: Biological Weapons Programs

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

October 28, 2008

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Adam C. Seitz, that summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The third working draft in the series is also now available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081028_iranbw_chapterrev.pdf

It covers the capabilities and uncertainties of Iran’s biological weapons program, as well as the problems posed by the ease of access to dual-use technology, and Iran’s ambiguous BW strategy and intentions. It also lays out biological attack scenarios, as well as the obstacles to weaponization of biological agents and possible delivery options for Iran.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Capabilities, Developments and Strategic Uncertainties

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

October 14, 2008

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

This first working draft in the series is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081015_iran.wmd.pdf
It covers the capabilities and uncertainties of Iran’s missile program, as well as other possible means of deliver that Iran could utilize in conjunction with its CBRN programs.

Draft paper presented at the international conference "Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen – Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention during and post-Conflict organized by the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) at the Dead Sea, Jordan, April 2017.

The Regional Office Gulf States of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and CARPO are jointly organizing the conference ‘‚Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen. Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention during and post-Conflict’ from April 03-05 2017 at the Dead Sea in Jordan. The aim of this conference is to bring together distinguished experts and practitioners from Yemen and the region as well as from Europe and the United States in order to discuss lessons learned from previous attempts at SSR in Yemen and to identify and develop practical policy options for constructive interventions during and post-conflict that aim to contribute to the stabilization of the country. The papers, which will include clear policy recommendations, will be jointly published by the project partners in a policy report.

Project duration: December 2016 to approximately May 2017.

http://carpo-bonn.org/en/addressing-security-sector-reform-in-yemen/
http://www.kas.de/rpg/en/events/71673/

Paper Abstract:
A historical commercial and migrant intersection, Yemen’s strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea and crossroad of three continents have contributed greatly to regional and international interest in Yemen’s internal security. Renewed regional and international geopolitical competition, continued efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism and Islamic extremism emanating from the region, and changes to the flow of oil resources due to other regional security concerns have only increased Yemen’s strategic importance to the global economy and a priority in the national security agendas of regional and international actors alike. Such considerations have not been lost on Yemen’s domestic incumbent and insurgent political, tribal and military elites, contributing, in part, to domestic political and military strategies meant to perpetuate a perception of internal insecurity that threaten the strategic interests of external regional and international stakeholders. The paper examines Huthi expansionism in the broader context of a domestic elite strategic culture that promotes perpetual insecurity and internal war, and namely how strategic considerations of regional and international actors influence the policies and actions of Yemen’s domestic elites, both incumbents (elites within the system) and insurgents (elites excluded from or opposed to the system), through comparison of three periods of the internal war in the Yemen (1994, 2004-2011, 2015-present). The history of internal war in Yemen has shown that conflict creates unlikely alliances and strange bedfellows, and the current conflict is no different, owing to a strategic logic of perpetuating conflict and creating/exacerbating divisions in an effort to consolidate/seize power. The paper utilizes theoretical and comparative approaches as a tool for analyzing the strategic factors and decision making that have contributed to perpetual insecurity punctuated by periods internal war in Yemen, with a particular emphasis in understanding the strategic dynamics driving Huthi expansionism and domestic, regional and international responses to it.

A version of the paper was subsequently published in MES Insights v8i3 June 2017, under the title "Houthi Expansionism, Internal War, Geopolitics, and the Yemen Quagmire".


Panel Summary:
Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam which can look back on a millennium of continuity in the northern parts of Yemen. Since Zaydism is regarded as a particularly tolerant form of Islam, its coexistence with Yemen’s other denominations was historically largely unproblematic. About 25 years ago, however, a development started which substantially undermined the coexistence of denominations in Yemen. The increasing spread of radical Sunnism (Salafism and Wahhabism) in Yemen, funded by neighboring Saudi Arabia, as well as the economic and political neglect of large sections of the Zaydi north by the Salih regime has led to the emergence of a Zaydi revivalism movement which was inspired by a deep sense of peril. As a result, previously unknown divisions and fault lines between Sunni and Shiite denominations began to arise in Yemen.
In 2001 a group known as Ansar Allah or Huthis, taking their name from the family of a noted Zaydi scholar, splintered off the nascent Zaydi revival movement by schism. In 2004 the Salih regime entered into a brutal six-year war against the Huthis, creating a martyr with the killing of Husayn al-Huthi, a prominent critic of Salih’s regime. After the resignation of President Salih in 2012, the Huthis were able to conquer large parts of northern Yemen including the capital Sana’a which they seized in 2014 with the assistance of army troops still loyal to Salih. The military campaign against the Huthis carried out by a Saudi-led international alliance of Sunni states, which began in 2015, has eventually turned Yemen into a central crisis zone and humanitarian disaster in today’s globalizing world. Although very much a proxy war in the expanding sectarian rhetoric between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the ongoing war has turned Yemen into an internal struggle for power between numerous groups and ideologies.
The panel aims at elucidating historical roots and current aspects of both Zaydi revivalism and Huthi expansionism by the means and tools of a number of scholarly disciplines (religious studies, social anthropology, political science, and strategic studies). The panel focuses on Huthi struggles to demarcate a Zaydi identity in the Modern Middle East; the impact of the so called “Sa’dah Wars” which the Yemeni state waged against the Huthis from 2004 to 2010; Huthi politics of political alliances since 2011; and strategic aspects of Huthi expansionist ambitions in Yemen. Through considering this wide array of aspects, the panel aims to shed light on the often opaque transformations and developments of previous years and decades and thus to achieve a better understanding of current conflict in Yemen.

Draft paper presented at the international conference "Yemen: Challenges for the Future organized by the The British-Yemeni Society (BYS) and London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI) at the University of London, UK, January 2013.

The Arab Spring prompted a wide range of reactions by militaries across the Middle East and North Africa, highlighting significant and diverse changes in Arab civil–military relations in recent decades. In Yemen, the unique brand of praetorianism that characterised the Salih regime’s relationship with the army was put to the test as they were confronted by widespread anti-government protests. The fracturing of the armed forces that ensued was reflective of the deep-seated divisions and shifting allegiances which have come to define Yemeni society. This shift in civil–military relations came as a result of various internal and external pressures to the Saleh regime’s system of tribal control and modifications to the regime’s overall governance strategy over the past decade. This paper explores such developments and their impact on Yemeni civil–military relations, highlighting the enduring and emerging challenges the interim Hadi government must contend with as it moves forward with the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative alongside its own reform agenda.

Paper subsequently published as part of an edited volume: "Ties That Bind and Divide: The ‘Arab Spring’ and Yemeni Civil-Military Relations” in Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (Saqi Books, 2014) edited by Helen Lackner.

Draft Paper presented at the Gulf Research Meeting "Future of Yemen Workshop" at University of Cambridge , UK, August 2014.

Yemen’s strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea, its proximity to Saudi Arabia, perceived regional instability, and internal fragmentation have made it vulnerable to external influence and pressures associated with regional and international competition, contributing to periods of balanced (in)stability and internal war in the Yemen. Since the end of the 1962 civil war between the Yemeni republicans – supported by Egypt – and the Yemeni royalists – supported by Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and the U.S. – an unstable balance maintained by an informal system of patronage politics has stood as the primary obstacle to internal war in the northern Yemen
Arab Republic (YAR) and later unified Republic of Yemen (RoY).
During his 33 years in power, Ali Abdullah Saleh compared his role in maintaining this unstable balance and governing Yemen as “dancing on the heads of snakes.” From the establishment of the YAR this balance has been under constant pressure, not only from internal stresses associated with the deep-seated divisions and shifting allegiances that have long defined Yemeni society, but also by external actors seeking to advance their interests within an informal patronage system dominated by a complex game of elite bargaining. This combination of internal factionalization, patronage politics and external interference have stood in the way of meaningful reform, contributing instead to a seemingly endless cycle of balanced (in)stability and internal war in Yemen.

Utilizing Harry Eckstein “On the Etiology of Internal War” as a
framework to compare four periods (1970-1979, 1980-1989,
1990-2000, and 2001-present), this paper examines the internal and external factors that have contributed to a cycle of balanced (in)stability and internal war in the Yemen since 1962, highlightingthe role that the policies of external actors play in the calculations of incumbents (elites within the system) and insurgents (elites excluded from or opposed to the system), and the challenges that a combination of the internal factionalization, patronage politics and external interference pose to ongoing state-building and counterterrorism efforts.